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Fish don’t try to turn sharks into vegetarians. Living immersed in a world of constant 
risk forces the fish to develop multiple ways to live with risk, rather than trying to 
eliminate it. The fish can dash away from the shark in a burst of speed, live in places 
sharks can’t reach, use deceptive coloration to hide from the shark, form schools with 
other fish to confuse the shark, it can even form an alliance with the shark, and all of 
these things may help the fish solve the problem of how to avoid getting eaten by the 
shark. But none of these adaptations will help the fish solve the general problem of 
predation, and they don’t need to. The fish doesn’t have to be a perfect predator-
avoidance machine. Like every single one of the countless organisms it shares a planet 
with, the fish just has to be good enough to survive and reproduce itself.  
The world in which we spend our daily lives is also full of risk. Acts of terrorism that 
seem to come out of nowhere. Wars that have carried on too long and show little 
progress toward resolution. Catastrophic failures of supposedly fail-safe oil rigs. 
Intensifying natural disasters fueled by global changes in climate. A distribution of food 
that leaves billions undernourished and millions of others facing an obesity epidemic. A 
cyber infrastructure that we’ve become increasingly dependent upon that also has 
become increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic attack. New diseases and new mutations 
of old diseases that threaten to become global pandemics. The major threats society 
faces today are ominous and complex interplays of human behavior and environmental 
change, global politics, and local acts of cruelty or carelessness, historical accidents, and 
long-simmering tensions. Some of these threats have plagued us as long as we have been 
human and yet we’ve made little progress against them, others are becoming more 
dangerous in synergy with rapid climatic and political changes, and still others are just 
now emerging.  
Yet the responses we been offered or forced to accept by the experts we’ve entrusted 
to solve these problems often seem frustratingly ineffective, naïve, or just plain 
ridiculous. When increased body screening of airline passengers was implemented after 
9/11, Richard Reid attempted to destroy an airliner with a bomb in his shoe. When 
shoes began to be screened in response to Reid’s attack, al Qaeda plotted to use a liquid 
explosive attack. When liquids were banned, Umar Abdulmutallab used a powdered 
incendiary hidden in his underwear in an attempted attack. A wall constructed between 
parts of the U.S. and Mexico border at a cost of between $1 million and $10 million per 
mile, slows down illegal immigrants by an estimated twenty minutes, even in its most 
fortified areas.1 And on a tiny island in the tiny town of Beaufort, North Carolina there is 
a tiny outpost of the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that 
studies fish populations and coastal ecology. There is little reason to suspect this outpost 
is on any terrorist’s list of desirable targets. Yet when the NOAA coastal scientists 
wanted to renovate and add some space a few years back, they were forced by the 
Department of Homeland Security to install enormous Wal-Mart style parking lot lights 
on their facility as a required security measure. This was ironic, since the scientists 
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working at the lab know full well that nighttime light pollution is a major threat to the 
ecology of the same coastal marine environments that they are paid by taxpayers to 
study.2   
The most famous line of the 9/11 Commission report was that 9/11 represented a 
“failure of imagination,”3 and this was certainly an apt description of the security 
situation up until 9/11. However, now that we imagine almost anything to be a threat to 
our security, a more pernicious problem faces all of our security systems: a failure of 
adaptation. Adaptation is the process of changing structures, behaviors, and interactions 
in response to changing conditions in the environment. Adaptability is the capacity to 
adapt to these changes – something that despite an unprecedented amount of attention, 
financial resources, and human lives sacrificed in the name of security since 9/11, has 
still largely eluded us. 
Fortunately, we have at our disposal a vast storehouse of largely untapped knowledge 
that could guide us in developing adaptable security systems. It is a massive set of 
proven solutions (and teachable failures) to the very same problem that unites all of the 
threats we face – that is, how to survive and thrive in a risky, variable, and uncertain 
world. Remarkably, this database is completely unclassified and accessible to anyone.  
The solutions I’m referring to are all contained in the staggering diversity of life on earth 
– millions of individual living and extinct species, and countless individuals within those 
species – which have been developing, testing, rejecting, and replicating methods to 
overcome the challenges of living on a continually changing planet. These organisms 
have been experiencing security challenges and developing solutions since long before 
any presidential administration or Congress has developed their security agenda, since 
long before 9/11 finally woke most of us to the new post-cold war reality, since long 
before industrialization pushed our biogeochemical cycles into chaos, and long before 
humans ever walked the earth. Indeed, the 3.5 billion-year history of life imbues 
biological systems with more experience dealing with security problems than any other 
body of knowledge we possess.  
And because we ourselves are biological creatures, our own species’ evolution (and 
the modern manifestations of that evolutionary process) is not only an integral part of 
this natural database, but perhaps the most important set of data to consider. This 
means that in addition to the ecologists, paleontologists, virologists, and evolutionary 
biologists who have something novel to contribute to our security debate, so too do 
anthropologists, psychologists, soldiers, and first responders who have extensive 
behavioral observations of people and societies under the stress of insecurity in an 
uncertain environment.  
I have been working with exactly these types of people for the last five years, 
primarily through my working group on “Darwinian Security” at the National Science 
Foundation-funded National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) in 
Santa Barbara, CA, and through interactive discussions with participants in several 
programs at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). The ideas 
developed in these lively discussions have been further honed in presentations to 
security think tanks and academic institutions, in corporate seminars and discussions 
with elected officials, and through response to our edited volume, Natural Security: A 
Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (University of California Press, 2008).  
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We have found that there is an increased openness among biologists to apply 
ecological and evolutionary ideas beyond biology, and receptiveness among societal 
institutions to incorporate biological knowledge into practice in, for example, using 
ecosystem analysis to study the global financial collapse. While there have been 
attempts to copy designs from nature to apply to security concerns (for example, 
designing submarine hulls based on the hydrodynamic shape of a tuna), and 
applications of biological models to studies of conflict, our approach considers key 
questions across the broad spectrum of security concerns and seeks insight from natural 
patterns and dynamics (Fig. 1). It is from this rich store of human knowledge that I 
present the general rules, specific examples, and pertinent applications of naturally-
inspired security that can be implemented in the analysis, planning and practice of 
security in society. 
 
	  
Figure 1: Naturally Inspired Security. Applying natural security is a reiterative process that begins with 
security questions in society and uses natural history-based inquiry to find analogies and models, which 
can then be applied to society. Applications can then be further refined with more detailed societal 
questions and biological observations. Examples given are illustrative, not exhaustive. 
BASIC PROPERTIES OF NATURAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Since we have incredibly limited communication with all but one species of the millions 
of natural security experts, how can we tap their knowledge? In some cases, we will have 
just the raw data to observe and work with – the remarkably diverse ecosystems, 
organisms, cells, and molecules that inhabit the earth. Still more knowledge can be 
gleaned from ancient observations of nature made since the earliest human societies, 
from painstaking natural history and evolutionary biology conducted over the 150 years 
since Darwin’s revolutionary On the Origin of Species, and from the most cutting-edge 
biological research on protein folding, genome mechanics, and network analysis that 
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have massaged these raw data into stories and models and theories about how biological 
organisms survive and thrive on a dangerous planet. What emerges from this vast and 
growing field of study are a few simple themes that are essential in understanding how 
to translate natural security to societal security. 
First, patterns in nature appear similar across different levels of biological 
organization. By levels of biological organization I mean the progression from molecules 
to DNA to cells to bodies of individual organisms to populations of those individuals to 
communities of those individuals interacting with individuals of other species to 
ecosystems which include the species, habitats, chemical and energetic interactions 
between them all in a given area. What is remarkable is that similar patterns – for 
example, using non-centralized organization to sense and respond to the environment – 
appear at each level of this organization. This nested quality of biological systems arises 
from their recursive character, meaning that the rules and patterns occurring at one 
level are not just similar to those at the next level, but essential in defining what 
happens at the next level. All of this is a good sign for applying biology to security in 
society because it suggests that biologically-guided solutions successfully implemented 
at one level (say, within a single office in FEMA) will be applicable at a completely 
different level (e.g., throughout the Department of Homeland Security). It also 
invalidates the excuse that we can’t change security policy unless our highest levels of 
government change. I argue that we can start at any level of society in instituting more 
adaptable security systems and, if we align our incentives correctly, these ideas can 
easily (in fact will almost inevitably) spread up and down different levels of organization 
in society.  
Second, complex natural patterns and processes arise from very simple building 
blocks. The four basic molecules of DNA code for a vast diversity of organisms that live 
in completely different ways and deal effectively with vastly different challenges. Moving 
up the levels of biological organization, natural selection, which has molded millions 
and millions of species into their forms today, is an incredibly simple process requiring 
just three simple building blocks: variation between individuals, environmental 
conditions that favor (or select) certain variants over others, and a means to reproduce 
those variants that are better suited to the environment. At yet a higher level, the simple 
process of individual organisms trying to survive and reproduce ends up producing 
networked ecosystems that are complex and resilient. Accordingly, natural security isn’t 
about rising to the complexity of the security threats we face by designing a hugely 
complex system with flow charts and acronyms and multi-variate statistical outputs. It’s 
about finding simple processes that impart our security systems with the adaptability to 
deal with a wide range of threats. 
Third, biological evolution doesn’t plan, design, or set goals of perfecting an 
organism. Evolution proceeds by solving survival problems as they arise, resulting in 
organisms that are not perfect, but “good enough” to survive and reproduce themselves. 
Likewise, in society we do not need to design perfect solutions to security problems – 
when we try to, they inevitably waste enormous amounts of resources while at best only 
marginally improve our security. We do need to define what is “good enough” and 
recognize that, as in natural systems, that definition will change continually through 
time.  
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Fourth, good ideas in evolution are often easy to spot because they appear nearly 
exactly the same across many different kinds of organisms. Although the DNA codes for 
millions of different organisms, the basic structure of the molecule and the process by 
which it replicates itself is the same across much of the living world. Heat shock 
proteins, which go around the body repairing damaged proteins, are both present and 
nearly identical in almost all organisms on earth. Thus, the biologically inspired ideas I 
propose here are not just stab-in-the-dark guesses that happened to work out well for a 
snail or a soybean plant somewhere, but time-tested billion-year-old solutions that have 
worked out in the coldest, highest, darkest, hottest, most predator-full and water-
starved places on earth.   
Fifth, good ideas in evolution are often the things that evolved independently 
multiple times. Eyes, for example, are a good solution for finding your way around in a 
complex world, but there isn’t one common type of eye that evolved billions of years ago 
and that we all share. This security solution arose independently several times in 
different types of organisms. Octopuses have incredible eyes that serve the same kinds 
of functions as our eyes, but they are unique to octopuses. This phenomenon, called 
convergent evolution, is evidence that evolution is not about taking one design and 
plopping it down all over, but about solving problems particular to a given organism in a 
given environment. Here I propose ideas for security that mimic natural solutions, but 
they may also have been explored by other people or organizations who didn’t make any 
reference to nature at all. I consider these coincident solutions to be examples of 
convergent evolution – different people trying to solve the problem of how to be ensure 
security in society and coming up with similar solutions. 
Sixth, under the lens of natural history, humans are special, but not that special. 
There are a number of adaptations we have – such as advanced cognition and language 
– that both set us apart from most other species and create a lot of the complex security 
threats we face, but we are, in the end, just another species that evolved through time to 
deal with security challenges in our environment. With over a billion people facing 
chronic nutrition shortages,4 and a host of old and emerging diseases that threaten to 
turn into human pandemics, we are undoubtedly still subject to the pressures of natural 
selection. Moreover, the way we have evolved has changed our environment enough to 
force us to adapt further. This cuts several ways for us – we are extremely adaptable, but 
we also may have changed our world and way of living faster than some parts of us can 
evolve. Some of our adaptations, which first arose in societies and on a planet 
completely unlike that in which we live today, can get us into trouble now.  
Finally, and most important, change and variation rule everything in nature. As 
Darwin mused during his long journey on the Beagle, “where on the face of the earth 
can we find a spot, on which close investigation will not discover signs of that endless 
cycle of change, to which this earth has been, is, and will be subjected?”5  
Darwin was referring to geology, the task he was primarily assigned during his fateful 
journey, but variation and change were very much at the heart of his subsequent 
biological studies. He felt it was essential to understand even the most minute variations 
– such as the microscopic differences between anatomies of the many species of 
barnacles that he cataloged in an enormous two-volume treatment6 – to understand that 
“mystery of mysteries” of where life comes from. The simple lesson from this is that no 
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effective security solution can be deployed and not modified or changed with time, 
because everything around it will be changing.  
These basic tenets of evolution provide the outside parameters for developing an 
adaptable approach to security, but careful study of nature reveals general trends and 
patterns that can be used to provide specific guidance for applying nature’s lessons to 
security in society.  
SPECIFIC PROPERTIES OF NATURAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Adaptable Organization 
The most adaptable and successful organisms, though wildly diverse in appearance and 
behavior, are all organized in a similar manner. Universally, they avoid the trap of 
centralized, top-down control by giving wide ranging power to multiple independent 
sensors to observe and respond to environmental change and threats.7 Organisms have 
done this by evolving specialized organs, developing highly sensitive sensory 
mechanisms, specializing functions into differentiated clones, and organizing nerve cells 
into networked clusters operating closest to the environmental interaction.  
By contrast, many of our security responses trend towards increased centralization. 
The most prominent security response after 9/11 was to create the massive Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), which quickly displayed its shortcomings during and after 
Hurricane Katrina, the response to which represented the worst post-9/11 security 
breach in the United States. A common question during and after Katrina was “Where 
was FEMA?” – referring to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which was 
ostensibly in charge of disaster relief efforts. Because it is a bureaucracy, the best way to 
find FEMA is by looking at the “Org” chart of its parent organization, DHS, at the time 
of Katrina (Fig. 2). FEMA is literally buried in a huge stack of blocks, all representing 
their own enormous bureaucracies – such as the Coast Guard and the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) – all required to run decisions up the chain of command 
to the secretary of Homeland Security and, consequently, all vying for the secretary’s 
attention.   
An organization like this might work fine in carrying out a planned set of tasks that 
continue routinely day after day. It’s like an early circuit board with a finite number of 
pathways through which the energy of decision-making can pass. But security problems 
are such precisely because they are not routine; they are highly variable and 
unpredictable. If one of the organizations inside one of those boxes needs to do 
something completely different than normal – as FEMA needed too after Katrina – it 
has little recourse to do so. 
That’s not to say that some organizations didn’t demonstrate some amazing 
responses to Katrina. The United States Maritime Administration, a branch of the 
Department of Transportation that maintains and contracts a fleet of ships to make 
vessels available during wars and national emergencies, quickly set up shipboard spaces 
that the various security agencies used as command centers. And of course, many 
individuals within all of the agencies, as well as individual citizens, improvised all sorts 
of effective responses to the hurricane.   
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 Fig. 2. Organizational chart for the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA is circled in dark blue.  
Source: U.S. Senate Budget Committee Staff, Nov. 15, 2002.  
 
It is often assumed that the stack of boxes leading to one central controller is the natural 
and inevitable way an organization develops. And people working within such an 
organization often assume that there is no way to change that system of organization 
without destroying the entire organization itself.   
The first assumption is, in fact, completely false, as proven by most successful 
biological organizations on earth. And challenging the second assumption, which is 
beginning to happen in societal organizations throughout the world, is the key to 
turning non-adaptable organizations, like DHS, into adaptive organisms that truly do 
keep us safer. Indeed, independent of our biological perspective, a number of sources 
have recognized the adaptability of decentralized organization in the context of 
business,8 social activism,9 and international governance.10 
Even large entities have learned to develop adaptable, distributed organization 
structures. Google, Inc. uses a decentralized system for encouraging development of 
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many of its products, which are then tested by billions of independent internet users.11 
For example, Google Flu Trends analyzes search behavior by internet users, specifically 
focused on flu-related search terms such as, “flu symptoms” and “flu remedies” under 
the assumption that more people will search such terms when flu is becoming more 
prevalent. Google Flu Trends show remarkable similarity to official U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) flu trend reports (which are compiled and 
published by CDC from doctor and hospital surveys) with one major exception: Google 
Flu Trends are available one to two weeks prior to the release of centrally controlled 
CDC data.12  
Adopting an adaptable organizational system does not require a complete 
reorganization of our security bureaucracies. Almost any organization can inculcate 
adaptable systems by shifting from giving commands to issuing challenges – essentially 
open contests to solve a clearly stated security problem. Most security practice today is 
designed by a small number of experts and implemented through a central authority 
issuing orders to civilians (e.g., surrender your bottled water to TSA officials in airports) 
or contractors (e.g. design an aircraft that does X for Y amount of money). By contrast, 
challenges essentially create adaptable security organizations by encouraging multiple 
independent agents to find the best solution to a problem, then rewarding the most 
successful agents, and in the best cases, repeating the challenge to replicate and improve 
on the best designs from the previous iteration.   
Even complex challenges can be successful at low cost and in relatively short time 
frames. For example, in 2002 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) presented an open challenge to a diffuse population of civilian groups to 
create autonomous vehicles that could navigate an obstacle course. The first iteration of 
this “Grand Challenge” in 2004 was fraught with failure. But groups learned from one 
another, and independently modified the wide variety of first-generation designs, 
selecting out poor performers and replicating successful components, resulting in high 
success in the second year which encouraged DARPA to issue yet more complex 
challenges in subsequent years. The most recent DARPA challenge (to find ten weather 
balloons scattered around the United States) was solved within a few hours by activating 
thousands of independent observers on the internet. 13  
Harnessing Uncertainty 
A decentralized organizational structure works because it allows organisms to deal with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty that is created by variation lies at the core of a wide range of 
security concerns. Organisms in nature actively exploit uncertainty and turn it to their 
advantage by creating uncertainty for their adversaries and reducing uncertainty for 
themselves. Predators create uncertainty by stalking from hidden vantage points, but 
when possible, prey reduce this uncertainty by vocally or behaviorally signaling the 
presence of predators – a strategy that both warns fellow prey about the threat and 
indicates to the predator that the element of uncertainty has been removed.14 To be 
effective the signaling must be directly tied to immediate threats. For example, ground 
squirrels will make vocal signals to bird and mammal predators (which can hear) but 
switch to “tail flagging” displays to deter snakes (which cannot hear), and will 
additionally heat their tails only when encountered by particular snakes (pit vipers) that 
can sense infrared signals.15 By contrast, when organisms in a community make 
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constant alarm calls regardless of the immediacy of the threat they only increase 
uncertainty for other members of the group, who must waste resources determining if 
the alarm is true or false.16 Analogously, the U.S. National Threat Advisory, which has 
remained at level “orange” for aviation since August 2006,17  is not aimed at deterring a 
particular threat and does little to reduce uncertainty among innocent travelers. We can 
vastly increase the uncertainty for our adversaries by just doing a small amount of 
random things every day in our security procedures. Currently we waste enormous 
resources to screen 100 percent of the people passing through security with little 
benefit. Laying aside the fact that this doesn’t even work to find the things we are 
looking for (knives, guns, explosive materials, and 6 oz. tubs of strawberry yogurt, all 
have which have been brought through security in recent years without detection),18 it 
also gives us almost no extra protection from real attackers.   
A low frequency of random screening (as opposed to a high level of screening equally 
applied to all) can deter someone who wants to evade detection.19 This is particularly 
true in the case of a terrorist attack because there is a very high cost of failure in such a 
plot, as there is for any predator. A lioness hunting an antelope must have very little 
uncertainty that her attack will be successful because if she fails, she has not only wasted 
energy and gotten hungrier, but she has also left her pride hungrier as well. A terrorist 
who gets caught not only fails to achieve the goal, but also puts his entire organization at 
grave risk of being discovered or counter-attacked. Indeed, this aversion to uncertainty 
drove several delays of the 9/11 attacks and may have led senior al Qaeda leaders to 
abort the attacks on 9/11 had they known one of the secondary operatives had been 
arrested.20  
What is attractive about randomizing security procedures is that it can actually 
drastically reduce the amount of time we waste in security lines (by screening much less 
than 100 percent of people for most things) while reducing the likelihood of an attack. 
These multiple benefits are not just serendipitous – natural security systems create 
positive feedback loops. For example, increasing uncertainty for a predator reduces the 
need for constant vigilance by the prey organism, which can then spend more resources 
on eating or mating or other needed security strategies. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has been experimenting with randomization and uncertainty in 
its 2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment, about which it testified 
that “random screening teams are among DHS’ most effective deterrence and detection 
tools for countering terrorist threats,”21 as well as through its Screening of Passengers 
through Observation Techniques (SPOT) behavioral detection program which deploys 
trained TSA agents to search for characteristic signs of stress and deception among 
passengers. Behavioral recognition has the advantage of returning control of uncertainty 
to the population it is trying to protect because it can be conducted from hidden vantage 
points or video. As a head behavioral screener at Dulles Airport (one of 161 airports 
where behavioral screening was initially deployed by TSA)22 remarked, “The observation 
of human behavior is probably the hardest thing to defeat. You just don’t know what I 
am going to see.”23 Nonetheless, the scientific basis for behavioral detection has not 
been well established,24 and the efficacy of layering discrete behavioral screening with 
other levels of verbal and non-verbal intent detection systems is currently being 
investigated.25 
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Learning Through Evolution  
A main reason that security walls and contraband screening don’t work against attackers 
is that they quickly learn what the barrier is and how to get around it. This problem has 
been recognized by cyber security experts who have recently acknowledged that forty 
years of attempts to make “perfect” systems protected by firewalls have only led to an 
increasingly vulnerable cyber infrastructure.26 One simple and effective cyber attack that 
has been successful in deliberate simulations and actual attacks involves physically 
scattering virus-infected USB drives in a parking lot and letting employees with security 
clearance inadvertently introduce the virus behind the firewall when they insert the 
drives into their workstations.27  
Even in relatively simple organisms, learning sets off a continual process of escalating 
threats and adaptive defenses. Birds learn that certain color patterns in spiders indicate 
the presence of poison and they avoid those patterns. Through time, other non-
poisonous spiders develop the color patterns of the poisonous types and thus avoid 
being eaten themselves; a selectively induced learning passed down through 
generations. Even the process of how animals learn is not immutable. That is, animals 
have some basic capacity for learning, but they can learn in accelerated ways depending 
on the environment they are put in. Monkeys, which are generally considered to have 
the learning capacity of a human two-year-old, can be trained in experimental settings 
to learn like a nine-year-old, including understanding a sense of their own self as a 
unique entity interacting with and affecting the world around them.28 The capacity for 
learning reminds us that no security adaptation should be assumed to be a safe and 
everlasting solution, because there is always the potential for an adaptable enemy to 
learn how to overcome it. 
A more formalized way to look at natural learning is through the framework of 
adaptation by natural selection. Examining the changing security environment in a 
Darwinian context that breaks down the three components of adaptive evolution – 
variation, selection, and replication – provides insight into how individuals and 
institutions learn from experiences with environmental threats. These factors may 
explain why the insurgents have been relatively successful against coalition forces in 
recent conflicts. Johnson argues that the nearly invariant ratio of insurgents killed or 
captured per U.S. soldier killed or captured throughout the Iraq war may be attributable 
to stronger selection pressure exerted by the more powerful side (the U.S.),29 which 
leads to faster adaptation among insurgent fighters, strategies, and technologies. This 
selection works on a more variable population of insurgents, who both come from more 
diverse origins than U.S. forces and utilize a wider range of tactics than U.S. forces, 
which are constrained by standard procedures, international conventions, and other 
norms.   
Ground observations support this analysis as the average time for insurgent fighters 
to adapt to new tactics, techniques, or procedures of U.S. troops is reported by 
counterinsurgency officers to be about fourteen days; insurgents apparently have 
learned to identify the signs of troop rotation and step-up attacks immediately following 
the arrival of new troops.30 This rapid adaptation is a well-appreciated problem. U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked at a congressional hearing in March 2007 
that “as soon as we …find one way of trying to thwart their efforts, [the insurgents] find 
a technology or a new way of going about their business”31. 
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Humans’ ability to learn is advanced relative to most other species and accelerated 
through a high degree of parental care, symbolic language, and communication 
networks that allow us to learn from environmental threats without actually 
experiencing them.32 In addition to creating a more threatening environment, learning 
can also greatly aid our security. For example, until 9/11 the normal response to a plane 
hijacking was to put up no resistance as hijackers made demands that were eventually 
negotiable and lethal threats were unlikely to be carried out. But on the same day that 
terrorists began using passenger planes as weapons of mass destruction, humans used 
networked technology to share information about the change in hijackers’ tactics and 
passengers on one hijacked plane immediately adapted a more active defense, risking 
their own security to protect a larger (and largely unrelated) group of humans. 
Subsequent airborne attack attempts by Reid and Abdulmutallab were similarly stopped 
by passengers. 
Using Symbiosis to Extend Adaptability 
All organisms are constrained in their adaptability at some point, but they can utilize 
symbiotic relationships to extend their inherent adaptive capacity to exploit new 
resources and environments. Symbiotic relationships are diverse and ubiquitous in 
nature, including relationships between species – such as predatory fish and much 
smaller fish – that would appear to have no reason to cooperate. Where these 
relationships appear cooperative in humans or other organisms, there is still debate over 
whether they: are codified through positive feedback, must be enforced by punishment, 
are conducted with the expectation of reciprocity, or arise in response to genetic 
relationships between kin.33 Regardless of the underlying mechanism, individual 
symbiotic relationships can confer multiple benefits to the larger environment. Studies 
on monkeys and apes show that when individuals are forced to begin a cooperative 
relationship (to help one another get food, for example), conflict overall between the 
animals is reduced.34 Small coral reef fish known as wrasses set up “cleaning stations” 
where large fish can have their parasites cleaned off, provided they don’t eat the smaller 
fish. The large fish in this symbiosis are not only less aggressive to their cleaning 
partners, but towards all other fish on the reef as well.35 
Cooperation among humans is far more complex than that among fish or monkeys, 
but the same surprising diversity of symbiotic relationship characterizes successful 
partnerships that diffuse security risks. New types of symbiotic partnerships between 
the most unlikely of collaborators are developing and ameliorating potential security 
crises around the globe. My colleague Terence Taylor, for example, has helped incubate 
symbiotic partnerships between Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians,36 as well as 
practitioners from five traditionally hostile countries on the Mekong River, all working 
together to identify and neutralize disease outbreaks on whatever side of borders they 
occur. Several features of these cooperative networks should be recognized. First, the 
networks have demonstrated success even beyond the feat of getting members of 
mutually hostile nations to work with one another. Network practitioners were quietly 
allowed into notoriously restricted Myanmar to do their work days, not weeks, after the 
catastrophic cyclone there. Second, these networks weren’t mandated by high levels of 
government or through international treaties, but have emerged from the ground up as 
local, adaptive responses to a real need to protect regional food supplies and human 
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health from pathogens that know no borders. Third, the networks were not designed to 
tackle the much larger and complex issues of creating peace between their member 
states, though they very well may be an opening to further peace agreements. Finally, 
the networks greatly expand the capacity of any individual member state, giving them a 
built-in impetus to continue; without the network, each individual state would not only 
be powerless over outbreaks in neighboring states, but would also be much less capable 
of tackling diseases within its own borders.   
HUMAN FACTORS 
Complex human behaviors also appear at the origins of many security problems. Taking 
a natural history approach to human behaviors, which involves looking at both their 
evolutionary roots and their commonalities across human groups, can provide valuable 
insight into their present manifestations. Seemingly irrational behaviors, such as radical 
fundamentalist belief systems, make more sense when viewed in the context of an 
evolutionary bias toward forming strong group identity in opposition to outsiders,37 a 
bias that has evolutionary origins long predating humans.38 Villarreal argues that 
human belief systems are simply the evolved manifestation of self recognition systems 
that have helped nearly all organisms maintain their autonomy since the earliest 
interactions between bacteria and viruses. Belief systems can spread through 
relationship networks. These human networks also share key characteristics with 
biological networks such as ecosystems, food webs, and social insect relationships.39 In 
particular, they show resilience which emanates from many individual components 
engaged in improving their own fitness. Many successful terrorist networks were found 
to originate through adolescent friendships developed in radical mosque-sponsored 
soccer leagues.40 Although human belief systems have diversified, they show common 
features across societies – for instance, adolescence as a nearly universal period when 
ideological, religious, and other beliefs are either abandoned or solidified.41 These three 
aspects of belief systems – their deep evolutionary roots, their network-reinforced 
resilience, and their universal features – suggest that they can’t be eliminated entirely, 
but that alternative pathways provided for adolescents (e.g., soccer clubs sponsored by 
secular or non-radical religious groups) may be effective in diffusing their most 
dangerous expressions. 
Nonetheless, applying Darwinian ideas to human society inevitably raises ethical 
issues. Biological evolution is often a tinkering process of trial and error and many 
individuals die under natural selection. Most societies don’t ethically accept the notion 
of sacrificing individuals to improve security, although engaging in armed conflict 
implicitly carries some aspects of this (and accordingly raises ethical deliberations). But 
biologically inspired security systems will not be perfect mimics of nature and they do 
not have to be beholden to the same forces of selection that operate on natural 
organisms.  We can deliberately select the aspects of natural security systems we would 
like to incorporate, devise artificial tests of their efficacy, and selectively reproduce only 
those systems that demonstrate improvements. Already, realistic amateur and 
professional probing has been used to test the efficacy of security systems, but the 
results have not necessarily been used to select for better systems. For example, the 
fallibility of systems that attempt to screen contraband carried by people entering secure 
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buildings and airport gates was revealed in tests well before Abdulmutallab smuggled 
incendiary material onto a plane,42 but the response to both the simulated and actual 
failure of contraband screening systems has been, in part, to appropriate more resources 
to them.  
This equation of human societies rewarding security failures stands in stark contrast 
to how the rest of the living world deals with failure. In the natural world, failed 
experiments are eliminated through the process of natural selection, while successful 
adaptations are rewarded and replicated through survival and relatively higher 
reproduction. We focus far less on success than on failures in society. For example, the 
U.S. Coast Guard was roundly criticized for its performance after the relatively small 
40,000-gallon Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco, but its admirable performance in 
containing and cleaning 9 million gallons of oil spilled after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
was almost completely ignored.43 In fact, the massive Townsend after action report on 
Katrina identified seventeen “Critical Challenges,” 125 recommendations, and 243 
action items, covering everything from search and rescue to transportation 
infrastructure to human services, but none of them addressed oil spill cleanup, the one 
unqualified success after Katrina.44 At the time, the oil spilled from Katrina was one of 
the largest oil spills on record, approximately two-thirds the size of the Exxon Valdez 
spill. Yet so forgotten were the oil spills caused by Katrina that by the time of the 2008 
presidential campaign, Republican candidate Mike Huckabee was able to argue publicly 
that “not one drop of oil was spilled” due to Katrina.45  
Both the engineering literature and the “organizational learning” literature place a 
strong emphasis on learning from failure. David Garvin, a leader in studies of 
organizational learning, argued that BP capitalizes on “constructive failure” which he 
defined as a failure that provides the critical learning components of “insight, 
understanding, and thus an addition to the commonly held wisdom of the 
organization.”46 The image of BP as an organization to emulate was shattered in April 
2010, when BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and led to an ecological and economic 
catastrophe. No doubt, the BP disaster will provide the company with all the 
components of “constructive failure” as Garvin defined them, but at a cost of greater 
than $1 billion to the company and with the uncertain economic and environmental 
impact on the Gulf of Mexico, it’s hard to see this kind of learning from failure as 
something to aspire to. 
In part, this discrepancy lies in the selective forces at work or not. In nature, selection 
is cleanly parsed out in life and death. In society, the selective agents are not so sharp.  
In both statute and practice, BP was allowed to operate without the necessary backup 
systems and safeguards;47 there was no pressure to improve performance in this part of 
their operations. We would like to think that our congressional representatives could do 
a better job of rewarding better performance among security and safety agencies, but the 
complex politics of congressional appropriations (which are often more closely tied to 
seniority of representatives than the merits of the funded projects) have created an 
enormous disconnect between performance and reward that is not likely to be repaired 
soon.  
 It is often news media that plays the strongest selective agent. After the Cosco Busan 
spill, images of hundreds of frustrated San Francisco volunteers waiting to clean up 
oiled birds, but held back by Government bureaucrats, were rolled on national media. 
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These kinds of images result in calls to Congress and demands for investigations. By 
contrast, the Coast Guard’s work on the post-Katrina and Rita oil spills hardly made 
newsworthy footage relative to images of people stranded on the roofs of their flooded 
houses. Because so much of the selective force on government agencies, especially when 
it comes in the form of media attention, focuses on mistakes (cost overruns, terrapin-
like foot dragging, and botched responses), adapting based on success is not something 
that can be instilled from the top down. We cannot (and would not want to) order media 
outlets to only report good news.  
Accordingly, the onus is on operatives at much smaller levels of government – 
battalion commanders, local police chiefs, and bureau heads – to identify successes, 
even if they were just one part of an operation that mostly failed, and to reproduce them. 
Sometimes this will mean promoting the people responsible for the success. Sometimes 
it will mean allocating more of a budget to activities that demonstrated success. But 
even where these local agents lack the power or resources to dole out these material 
rewards, they do have a very powerful and very inexpensive resource at their disposal. 
They can reproduce successes by teaching others in their field how to adopt their 
successful activities. This kind of teaching and learning is best facilitated through small 
informal networks of practitioners. For example, the armed forces have used intranets, 
such as NCOcorps.net, to give soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan a forum to share 
information about successful practices as experienced by troops in the field.48 This peer-
to-peer training turns out to be an invaluable resource to new soldiers who come into 
combat with much less experience, and therefore much less adapted, than the 
insurgents that they will be fighting. Indeed, this method of replication brings us full 
circle back to the adaptability of decentralized organizations, as illustrated in the 
following case study of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
A CASE STUDY: IED Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan  
The case of IED deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates several points relevant to 
natural security. The issue of IED came to most civilian’s attention in a dramatic fashion 
on December 8, 2004, during a televised visit between Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and National Guard soldiers preparing for deployment in Kuwait. To the 
cheers of the soldiers assembled, Specialist Thomas Wilson, a thirty-one-year-old 
Tennessee National Guardsman, pointedly asked the secretary why he and his fellow 
soldiers were being forced to rummage through garbage dumps to find armor to strap 
on to their vehicles, which provided inadequate protection in the combat zone. 
Rumsfeld was initially taken aback, then tartly retorted “you go to war with the Army 
you have.”49  
The terse exchange belied a critical difference in adaptability between soldiers like 
Specialist Wilson and a large security organization like the Department of Defense. For 
the troops on the ground, the process of adapting began soon after the invasion of 
Bagdad. They “went to war with the Army they had” (to paraphrase Rumsfeld), and it 
worked brilliantly for a while. With superior firepower, training, and air superiority, 
even the most feared of Saddam Hussein’s forces virtually collapsed in front of the 
advancing coalition force. But as the old regime collapsed, the ground became rich for 
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any number of new threats to sprout up. The threat environment radically changed. 
Suddenly, thousands of soldiers, independently as individuals and linked through the 
units they fought with, were observing that hidden improvised explosive devices (IED) 
were becoming their biggest threat to security. Whereas the DoD had planned for a war 
against AK-47s, Scud Missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, soldiers on the ground 
began to see their enemies as random trash piles, sudden fender benders in downtown 
traffic, and cell phones; hiding, distracting from, and detonating IED. By the time 
Wilson was so incensed as to dare breach military protocol to give a superior officer a 





Figure 3. Deaths per month of U.S. troops in Iraq (red) and Afghanistan (green) and associated 
security related events. Data source: www.icasualties.org.   
The soldiers adapted the best that they could, welding metal plates to their vehicles, 
blocking up culverts to eliminate the most obvious niches for bombers to use, and 
learning to identify the signs of hidden bombs in otherwise unremarkable debris. But 
their ability to adapt was limited by forces beyond their control – by the equipment they 
were given, by the available scrap metal, by the rules of engagement that they were 
ethically and legally bound by – and the casualties mounted.  
By contrast, the Department of Defense had virtually unlimited resources, especially 
after 9/11 when no politically-minded congressperson or senator would ever turn down 
a military appropriation request. What the DoD lacked was adaptability. Even as 
Specialist Wilson and his comrades were frantically tracking the rapidly changing tactics 
of insurgents, the DoD was slowly churning away on weapons systems and fighting 
procedures that had been dreamed up long ago in places far away from the streets of 
Baghdad and Fallujah. Rumsfeld’s retort to Wilson revealed a centralized view where 
small numbers of intellectuals design a battle plan and the accompanying technology 
years in advance, and that’s what you go to war with. Moreover, even to bring the 
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idealized technological solutions to deal with the threats theorized by DoD experts, the 
Department was bound by a ponderous top-down procurement system in which a small 
number of large contractors submitted bids for development of weapons systems that 
inevitably ran over budget and beyond the estimated timeline. Even after congressional 
outrage from the exchange between Wilson and Rumsfeld fueled calls to speed up 
production and deployment of mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP), they 
did not arrive in Iraq in until November 2007 – nearly three years later. By that time, an 
additional 1,589 of Wilson’s colleagues had been killed in IED attacks.  
The DoD solution certainly arrived too late to save their lives, but also too late to even 
deal with the original threat. A rapid downward trend in IED attacks and deaths was 
already well on its way by the time the MRAP arrived in Iraq. This downward trend can 
largely be linked to the successful fostering of two sets of symbiotic relationships in Iraq. 
First, General Petreaus authorized a shift in strategy towards engaging local populations 
to break up IED-producing networks, which resulted in increasing numbers of tips to 
soldiers about IED operations. Second, an inter-service partnership between ground 
soldiers and electronic warfare experts that devised methods to disarm wirelessly 
detonated IED greatly reduced the effectiveness of the remaining IED.51  
The lesson here is that adaptation is primarily forged out of behaviors and 
relationships that can respond to a changing environment, not out of material solutions. 
Indeed, the MRAP that arrived too late in Iraq were ready just in time for a renewed 
offensive in the long-simmering war in Afghanistan. They have undoubtedly saved the 
lives of soldiers who were hit by IED, but they certainly haven’t led to a decline in IED 
attacks or deaths, and may in fact have attracted more IED attacks. This is because the 
environment of Afghanistan is much more rugged than that of Iraq, making most of the 
country downright impassable to 14- to 24-ton vehicles like the MRAP.52 Taliban 
operatives in inexpensive second-hand Toyota pickup trucks (probably the most 
adaptable vehicle ever built) could operate at will without interference from the 
lumbering U.S. forces. The few roads in Afghanistan that were MRAP accessible quickly 
became targets for IED attacks (which had been only a minimal threat up until this 
point) so that travel became a cumbersome affair, sometimes taking all day to move 
twelve kilometers or so.53 In fact, after only two years of deployment, nearly half of the 
16,000 MRAP produced (at a cost of $500,000 each) are being put on “inactive status”. 
What does this tale of differential adaptation tell us? First, adaptation requires 
leaving or being forced from your comfort zone and into a place where you observe and 
experience new threats to your security. Second, adaptation takes resources, but 
resources don’t guarantee adaptation. Third, parts of an organization can be adaptable 
even if the organization is non-adaptable as a whole. Fourth, an adaptation developed 
for a given threat in a given environment may be useless, or even counterproductive, in 
a different environment.  
LESSONS FOR AN ADAPTABLE FUTURE 
It is important to recognize that the untapped secrets of natural security systems are not 
classified in any way. Rather, they are laid out in the structure of fossil and living 
organisms, in fragments of DNA, and in the observable behaviors of the organisms 
themselves. Translating ideas from nature into usable security solutions in society 
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requires sensitivity to both how humans and human societies are different from other 
evolutionary systems, but also their common roots and analogous dynamics. Overall, 
the goal of a natural security system is to help society live with risks, rather than waste 
resources trying to eliminate them, by developing and maintaining adaptive security 
systems. An analysis of biological security systems suggests that a cascading set of 
interrelated strategies can provide the best means for dealing with the variation and 
uncertainty in nature.  
In society, a cascade towards adaptive security can be initiated by giving more power 
to individual agents to sense and respond to threats. These agents could be individual 
people in a community, or individual offices, agencies, or states responsible for discrete 
aspects of a larger security mission. They do not operate completely independently, but 
rather are empowered through problem-solving challenges issued by an agency that has 
the resources or power to implement solutions. Multiple agents devising and testing a 
variety of security systems will provide greater likelihood of finding efficient solutions, 
redundancy to hedge against poor solutions, and potential for more rapid adaptation if 
selection pressures (such as budgets or media coverage) can be aligned to reward 
successful adaptations. Symbiotic partnerships between these agents can then extend 
their utility by bringing new skills and perspectives into emerging problem solving 
networks.  
Given the vast diversity of life, we have only scratched the surface of potential lessons 
from nature for security in society. For example, biologists understand that organisms in 
nature inherently accept that risk is inevitable in the environment and, through 
selection, manage to balance the costs and benefits of developing new adaptations. But 
we have little ability to predict why certain types of adaptations will arise in a given 
place or time, which could then reflect on how society could optimally manage a 
portfolio of emerging and existing risks. Getting closer to this understanding may 
involve a deeper appreciation (using appropriate biological models such as the immune 
system and host-parasite interactions) of how particular adaptations take place in a 
range of situations – are they the product of escalation through repeated direct 
interactions, a response to chronic stress, or a generalized response to cope with a 
potential range of natural variation? Additionally, focusing on rapid adaptation and 
rapid feedback cycles – such as occur with retroviruses which manage to hijack the 
adaptive machinery of the immune system and use it against the host body – could be 
enormously important as a model for understanding how radical ideas are now rapidly 
spread peer-to-peer using simple messaging between previously unlinked terror groups. 
This same model could be adapted to aid with the likely need to adapt rapidly to climate 
change. Finally, my group has largely focused on evolutionary successes, but the history 
of life is replete with apparently well-adapted organisms that went extinct. What are the 
conditions under which even organisms that sense the environment well and reduce 
their own uncertainty go extinct and what can this tell us about our own failures? This 
reminds us of a sobering basic tenet of natural security: those who embrace the process 
of adaptation survive and thrive, those who don’t, go extinct. 
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